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Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evi-
dentiary Foundatiom of International Criminal 
Convictiom. By Nancy A. Combs. Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Pp. xi, 420. Index. $125. 
Over the past twenty years or so, international 
criminal law has developed frorri an establishment 
of a norm against impunity for international 
crimes to a proliferation of international and 
hybrid criminal tribunals, culminating in the 
establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). 1 Throughout this evolution and the 
6 Capoccia & Kelemen, supra note 3, at 368. 
7 !d. 
1 StegenerallyMARKA. DRUMBL,ATROCITY, PUN-
ISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
academic discourse accompanying it has been the 
inevitable questioning of the assumptions under-
lying the initially enthusiastic reception of these 
institutions. Much of this questioning initially 
dealt with whether the punishment meted out by 
these institutions actually served the classical pur-
poses of criminal punishment, especially general 
and specific deterrence. 2 In a broader context, dis-
cussion ensued as to whether criminal tribunals 
assisted or impeded postconflict reconstruction. 
In these discourses, realists questioned more fun-
damental aspects of the usefulness of international 
criminal trials, and comparative scholarship eval-
uated the best mix of legal systems to address the 
seemingly unique aspects ofinternational criminal 
trials of the perpetrators of mass atrocities.3 In all 
of these scholarly perspectives, a presumption 
arose that the tribunals functioned more or less as 
contemplated on a systematic level, however 
unsatisfactory or flawed the analyses or outcomes 
might be in individual cases or even types of cases. 
Simply put, international criminal tribunals func-
tioned to determine-with the requisite due pro-
cess-an individual's innocence or guilt relating 
to the offenses specifically charged based upon the 
most reliable and relevant evidence that could be 
obtained. 
Primarily, the last part of this presumed equa-
tion, the evidentiary aspect, is seriously called into 
question in Fact-Finding Without Facts by Profes-
sor Nancy Combs of William and Mary Law 
School, who served as a legal adviser at the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal prior to her aca-
demic career. The modest assumption that inter-
national criminal trials might at the least be "useful 
mechanisms for determining who did what to 
whom during a mass atrocity" (p. 4) is no longer 
a safe assumption after Combs's blistering de-
construction of the fact-finding process. The 
core of the book is her empirical evaluation of 
thousands of pages of transcripts from the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the 
2 See, e.g., Julian Ku & J ide Nzelibe, Do International 
Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian 
Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006). 
3 ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES 
AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE 
(2005). 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the 
East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes 
(Special Panels). Combs justifies the obvious 
absence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) due to the rel-
ative commonality of education, culture, and lan-
guage between witnesses and courtroom staff in 
the ICTY. In addition, given the prevalence of 
African conflicts in the ICC, the flaws in the other 
tribunals have more relevance to issues of accurate 
fact-finding because the ICC cases thus far do not 
have the relative communality of courtroom staff 
and witnesses as the ICTY. 
The magnitude and prevalence of these fact-
finding flaws discovered by Combs will surprise 
even the most cynical followers of international 
criminal law. Given the lack of documentary evi-
dence of atrocities and given the difficulties of 
obtaining forensic evidence, it is not surprising 
that most evidence comes from eyewitnesses. The 
inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony in 
domestic trials, particularly for violent crimes, is 
well documented and has not gone unnoticed by 
the tribunals. Nevertheless, the tribunals have 
relied upon eyewitness testimony so inherently 
suspect in the way in which it was collected as to be 
patently unreliable. For example, in the ICTR case 
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda,4 witnesses were asked 
out of court to identify a male defendant from a 
single picture of a group of individuals, but he was 
the only man in the picture, and he had a red mark 
on his shirt for good measure. This example is one 
of many that Combs provides throughout the 
book that are laughable in their absurdity, despite 
the seriousness of the flaws that they reveal. In 
some instances, the disconnect between the ques-
tions asked of the witness and the answers pro-
vided demonstrates that the witness had no 
understanding of the questions being asked. The 
author's painstaking review of the transcripts 
reveal, by way of illustration, that a witness being 
asked repeatedly about critical timing issues might 
well respond with descriptions of clothing and yet 
be deemed reliable for whatever information the 
witness manages to convey. Among other fact-
finding impediments, Combs highlights wit-
4 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, No. ICTR-95-54A-T 
(Jan. 22, 2004). 
nesses' trouble not only estimating distances, 
duration, and numbers but also understanding 
maps, photographs, and sketches; the failure of 
Western court personnel to understand the 
answers they do receive; in-court testimony incon-
sistencies with out-of-court statements; and pur-
poseful attempts to evade questions. Again, none 
of these problems is unique to international tribu-
nals, but their prevalence and obviousness in the 
transcripts are striking and disturbing. Similarly, 
the causes that Combs suggests for these impedi-
ments to fact-finding-lack of education and life 
experiences, differences in culture and language, 
and difficulties of straightforward translation-
are not as surprising as the extraordinary magni-
tude of the problems that they produce. 
Given these evident and prevalent fact-finding 
deficiencies, why have the trial chambers been so 
accepting of such faulty evidence? The author sug-
gests that principles of organizational and associa-
tional criminal liability, purportedly discredited at 
Nuremberg, continue to be influential in the 
politicized atmosphere of international tribunals. 
The final chapters address the normative ques-
tions raised by these fact-finding deficiencies. 
Combs suggests various adjustments in the pre-
trial, trial, and posttrial processes to improve fact-
finding, but emphasizes that large-scale proce-
dural reform may still be necessary. She proposes 
"contextualization" of international criminal pro-
cedure (p. 286), with more incorporationoflocal-
ized domestic criminal procedure in tribunals 
rather than the one-size-fits-all approach previ-
ously taken in the establishment of tribunals. 
Another proposal, which she describes as less desir-
able (and certainly more controversial), is overt 
recognition of associationalliability through the 
joint criminal enterprise doctrine to "reflect the 
actual nature of current tribunal fact-finding" (p. 
322). 
Ultimately, Combs offers and explains her sup-
port for international criminal tribunals regardless 
of the fact-finding deficiencies. Drawing infer-
ences of guilt from official positions or institu-
tional affiliation remains problematic, although 
less so if the defendants are thoughtfully selected in 
the context of the conflict in which they were 
involved. She utilizes the scholarship suggesting 
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that the proof standard of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" is actually a highly variable standard of 
proof that requires different levels of certainty in 
different cases. In other words, virtual certainty in 
fact-finding and guilt determinations is an illusion 
in any criminal justice system and does not negate 
other justifications for the necessity and legitimacy 
of international criminal tribunals. Her thorough, 
expansive, and meticulous research into the tri-
bunals' transcripts provides virtually irrefutable 
evidence that the magnitude of these problems in 
reliable fact-finding has never been fully appreci-
ated, with all the consequences for international 
criminal justice that entails. 
At the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American 
Society oflnternational Law (ASIL), the Interna-
tional Criminal Law Interest Group sponsored a 
roundtable discussion of Fact-Finding Without 
Facts with Combs, this reviewer as moderator, and 
six other participants: Professor David Crane of 
Syracuse Law School and founding chief prosecu-
tor of the SCSL, the first hybrid international 
criminal court; Professor Margaret deGuzman of 
Temple Law School, former law clerk in the Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and legal adviser to 
Senegal at the Rome Conference; Professor Han-
nah Garry, director of the International Human 
Rights Clinic at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia School ofLaw and former legal officer in the 
appeals chamber of the ICTY/ICTR; Professor 
Saira Mohamed of U.C. Berkeley School of Law 
and former senior adviser to the U.S. special envoy 
for Sudan; Marko Divac Oberg, legal officer at the 
ICTY; and Dan Saxon, Leverhulme Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law at Cambridge University and former 
senior prosecuting attorney at the ICTY. They all 
offered their own personal views, not necessarily 
reflecting the views of the institutions with which 
they had been affiliated, but with a wealth of first-
hand experience with the fact-finding processes of 
international tribunals. No one questioned either 
Combs's assessment of the fact-finding problem 
or the empirical evidence demonstrating it. As one 
commentator remarked, "Nancy Combs has dem-
onstrated that fact-finding at international crimi-
nal tribunals is startlingly unreliable."5 
5 The quotations from the roundtable participants 
will be available in the 20 11 ASIL Proceedings. 
The roundtable was standing room only, and 
the audience heard a variety of responses from the 
roundtable participants (and audience) as to what 
the appropriate "remedy" for this conceded fact-
finding deficiency should be. As a result, the dis-
cussion assumed the empirical inevitability of her 
research and focused beneficially on the appropri-
ate response to these fact-finding deficiencies. The 
most discussed aspect of Combs's normative con-
clusions was the proposition that convictions in 
international criminal tribunals may be legiti-
mate, regardless of fact-finding deficiencies based 
on realistic assessments of group criminality. In 
reinforcing and yet limiting that suggestion, her 
book proposes that tribunals should limit their 
indictments to the upper-echelon leaders of mass 
atrocities. 
Oberg spoke of his experience with the I CTY, a 
tribunal that, as noted, was not included in 
Combs's analysis. He suggested that the tribunals 
or the ICC be less insecure in rejecting evidence or, 
when evidence is accepted, that the basis of its 
acceptance be adequately explained in the judg-
ment. Behind the scenes, he also suggested that the 
judges discuss to whatever extent possible each 
case while it is fresh in their minds, with summa-
ries to follow. Clearly, putting defendants on trial 
as soon as possible while evidence and memories 
are fresher is a huge challenge to the international 
tribunals evaluated (with the possible exception of 
the Special Panels) but perhaps will be less so 
with the ICC. To avoid the possibility of convict-
ing an innocent person, Oberg recommended that 
the solution to such a problem is to indict fewer 
persons. 
Saxon expanded upon Oberg's experience with 
the ICTY to speak to other reasons why the ICTY 
might have experienced fewer problems identified 
by Combs, aside from the relative commonality 
suggested above. One of the most intriguing 
suggestions was that-whatever violations might 
have occurred-each party to the armed conflict 
have professional officers and soldiers in their 
units and well-educated civilian leaders. One need 
look no farther than the Geneva Conventions for 
recognition that mandatory education in the laws 
of war is every state's responsibility, not just for its 
military but also for its civilian population. If the 
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most developed and privileged countries in the 
world do not educate their populace in the 
humanitarian laws of war, what expectations of 
compliance can be imposed on paramilitary 
groups in less stable situations? The educational 
requirements of the Geneva Conventions are 
often overlooked, if not totally ignored, for civil 
society. 
Mohamed concluded that associational respon-
sibility is not as discredited in international law as 
many scholars might assume. She demonstrated 
that associational doctrines at Nuremberg were 
not totally discredited and that certain associa-
tions (the SS, SD, Gestapo, and Nazi Parry lead-
ership) were determined to be criminal organiza-
tions. She endorsed Combs's suggestion that 
associational doctrines, especially extended joint 
criminal enterprise (JCE III), might be used to 
reduce reliance on unreliable eyewitness testi-
mony. For future development of the law in the 
ICC, Mohamed noted that it is not cleat whether 
JCE III is an available form ofliability under the 
Rome Statute, unfortunately making it less likely 
to remedy deficiencies in fact-finding in that 
forum. She offered another justification for asso-
ciationalliability-that is, to place blame appro-
priately for mass atrocities on states and institu-
tions rather than on a handful of perpetrators. 
DeGuzman examined how the goals ofinterna-
tional criminal punishment may have co be reeval-
uated to allow expanded reliance on group crim-
inality in international criminal tribunals. In one 
of the book's most challenging perspectives, 
Combs evaluates whether proof"beyond a reason-
able doubt" is not the actual standard even in those 
legal systems that herald it, minimizing the signif-
icance ofless than certain factual determinations. 
DeGuzman challenged the concept that interna-
tional tribunals should accept a standard of proof 
that" can encompass a relatively broad probability 
range" given the purposes to be served by interna-
tional criminal tribunals (p. 344). Even assuming 
the legitimacy of group criminality, deGuzman 
noted that the suggestion that this assumption 
be combined with prosecution of only the top 
organizational leaders would not seem to serve the 
purposes of retribution, deterrence, community 
reconciliation, historical record creation, or inter-
national law formulation. In the book, Combs 
addresses these arguments by suggesting that most 
international criminal facts simply cannot be dem-
onstrated with the optimal level of certainty. 
The importance of empirical research is that it 
challenges the unsubstantiated assumptions of 
researchers who have proceeded in theory based on 
such assumptions. If Combs's empirical research is 
essentially unchallenged, as is likely, it is a game-
changer for how international criminal justice 
should proceed. It is noteworthy that the author 
herself does not take these fact-finding deficiencies 
as negating the value and legitimacy of interna-
tional criminal tribunals. It would be far too easy, 
and inappropriate, to use Fact-Finding Without 
Facts as an argument against recognition of 
international criminal tribunals as instruments of 
justice. 
Crane made the final remarks of the roundtable 
discussion. He pointed out that we are only fifteen 
years into this experience of multiple international 
criminal tribunals, "at the beginning of the begin-
ning" of international criminal justice. Crane and 
Combs agree that her findings bring to the fore the 
need for more utilization of domestic courts to 
punish mass atrocities. In addition, perhaps, non-
adversarial domestic measures may be more effec-
tive in context, such as the town hall program 
started by Crane for cultural awareness and public 
education in Sierra Leone. He noted that what he 
called a "grand experiment" in international crim-
inal justice-the establishment of the interna-
tional criminal tribunals-has shown relatively 
little creativity or flexibility in the form that it has 
taken so far. As more tribunals are starred and as 
the ICC defines itself beyond the four corners of 
the Rome Statute, the most fundamental question 
going forward is the concluding question in 
Crane's remarks: "Is the justice we seek the justice 
they want?" 
Fact-Finding Without Facts provides hard facts 
about evidentiary deficiencies in international 
criminal tribunals to advance the purposes of 
international criminal justice and to confront 
some hard truths in any criminal justice system 
along the way. As noted, Combs does not in any 
way advocate ending international criminal tribu-
nals, but the book is a bold and persuasive call for 
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a new, wiser, and more realistic beginning to this 
beginning. 
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